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m (x) = 1.
From Bayes’ rule, we know that the expected utility that bidder i gets, by placing bid





i (bi;vi). Then using equations 23, 24, 25 and 26, this becomes:





0(vi ¡ !) ¢ ©m¡1(!) ¢ d!
The terms ©m(x) and ©m¡1(x) after a number of mathematical transformations15 can be













where Z(x) = 1 ¡ (1 ¡ F(g¡1(x))) ¢ (1 ¡ H(x)).
As the true valuation vi is not known and bidder i knows that vi is drawn from Gvi(),
we use Bayes rule to compute the expected utility of bidder i when he places bid bi given
that vi is unknown, but the “uncertain valuation” vi is. Therefore, the expected utility is:
Eui(bi) =
R 1
¡1 Eui(bi;x) ¢ G
0
vi(x) ¢ dx )

















To ﬁnd the bid which maximizes the expected utility, we set #Eui
#bi = 0. Using equa-

















1 ¡ (1 ¡ F(g¡1(bi))) ¢ (1 ¡ H(bi))
￿
Since the bid bi that maximizes the expected utility is bi = g(vi), we substitute this in the
equation to get equation 22.
When the bidder’s valuation is vi = r, he bids bi = r, provided the ci ¸ r is, hence the
boundary condition. ￿
We would like to point out that the boundary condition changes because of the valuation
uncertainty. More speciﬁcally, it is no longer necessarily the case that a bidder will only
participate if his valuation is higher than r. Since they are not risk neutral and they don’t
know their true valuation, we need to compute value r, which is the lowest valuation that
15 We explain brieﬂy how to simplify the term for ©m(bi):
©m(x) =
PN
n=1 C(N ¡1;n¡1)¢((1¡F(r))¢(1¡H(r)))n¡1 ¢(1¡(1¡F(r))¢(1¡H(r)))N¡n ¢
￿Pm¡1












i=0 C(N ¡1;i)¢((1¡F(g¡1(x)))¢(1¡H(x)))i ¢
￿PN
n=1 C(N ¡1¡i;N ¡n)¢(1¡
(1 ¡ F(r)) ¢ (1 ¡ H(r)))N¡n ¢ ((1 ¡ F(r)) ¢ (1 ¡ H(r)) ¡ (1 ¡ F(g¡1(x))) ¢ (1 ¡ H(x)))n¡1¡i￿
This gives us the desired formula. A similar proof simpliﬁes term ©m¡1.